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Introduction 
The European integration process started more than 60 years ago. Nevertheless, in 
2017, the Commission presented a series of new white papers on the future of Europe in order 
to tackle the Brexit vote and the growing European populism (Hobolt, 2016; Rittberger & 
Blauberger, 2018; Calliess, 2018). Nonetheless, the major challenge is the redesign and 
stabilization of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Zimmermann, 2016; Warren, 
2018). Since 1 January 1999, we have a common currency responsible for 340 million 
Europeans in now 19 Member States of the Euro area. The Eurozone has been undoubtedly 
the boldest integration step. 
Right from the beginning, the Eurozone had several institutional flaws, one such 
example being the asymmetric nature of interest rate shocks, aligned with the imposed budget 
constraints on fiscal policy. Other flaws are low commitment to satisfy the Maastricht criteria 
or the enforcement of the rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact (Herzog & 
Hengstermann, 2013; Herzog, 2016). In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis 
policy-makers started to overhaul the Eurozone’s institutions. Among others, European 
policy-makers established the European Semester in 2011, the Fiscal Compact in 2012, the 
Herzog, B. (2018). Reforming the Eurozone: Assessment of the Reform Package 
by the European Commission – Treating Symptoms or Root Causes?. Economics 
and Sociology, 11(3), 59-77. doi:10.14254/2071-789X.2018/11-3/4 
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Six- & Two-Pack in 2013 and the Banking Union in 2014. As a result, the euro area 
architecture is more resilient today, but still remains incomplete (COM 2017/821). 
Recently, the Commission reopened the reform discussion again in order to reshape 
the EMU, as expressed in recent reports, such as the “Five Presidents’ Report” as of 2015 and 
notably “The Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union” in 
2017 (Juncker et al., 2015; Dombrovskis & Moscovici, 2017; COM 2017/291). Finally, on 6 
December 2017 the Commission presented a full reform package (see Table 1). Similar to 
Blanchard et al. (2017), the Commission proposes the creation of a fiscal capacity aiming to 
facilitate large asymmetric shocks across the Member States. 
The Commission argues that currently there is both an economic and political reform 
window due to robust economic growth, the most positive economic sentiments since 2000, 
the lowest unemployment rate since 2008, and the highest popular support for the euro 
currency since 2002 (COM 2017/821). The reform package builds on the vision of president 
Juncker’s State of the Union address (Juncker, 2017). In general, the heads of the States agree 
there is a need for further progress, as concluded during the European Council meeting on 20 
October 2017. Nonetheless, the Member States have different, sometimes even orthogonal, 
visions for the future of the Eurozone. 
This is a rather long-lasting controversy. Different visions have been prevalent since 
the Treaty of Maastricht. Already in the 1990s, some argued for the immediate need of a 
political union before the establishment of a currency union. Unfortunately, due to political 
resistance, policy-makers designed the monetary union without a political union first. In doing 
so, they argued that a monetary union – sooner, rather than later – automatically creates 
economic and political convergence. The Commission promotes this notion recurrently by 
demanding an “ever closer union” since the EU Solemn Declaration as of 19 June 1983. 
Interestingly, advocates of the second notion – the so-called “convergence theory” – disdain 
the prerequisite of a political union. Indeed, these people emphasize that sovereignty is a 
matter of Member States, particularly in fiscal, economic and social policies.  
As known from history, the precondition for a stable monetary union needs both a 
transfer of sovereignty and a common (cultural) identity (Bordo & Jonung, 1999). Recent 
research show that the EU is far from perfect in this respect. In fact, the EU is distancing itself 
from becoming a culturally and politically homogenous entity. Alesina et al. (2017, p. 16) 
conclude: “During the last 30 years there is virtually no evidence of cultural convergence, 
neither within, nor across countries”. This is surprising, given that the EU devotes 
considerable efforts and funds to obtain an “ever closer union”. Furthermore, the sovereign 
debt crisis revealed that the Member States are unwilling to shift responsibility and 
sovereignty to the European level. Instead, they only agreed upon new rules under the notion 
of the rule-based architecture. 
The Commission concludes that opinions about the reform package may differ, but 
there is broad consensus on the need for further progress. Nonetheless, it is an odd perspective 
by the Commission in demanding merely more centralization (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 
2016; Miller, 2017; Scholten, 2017). The Commission believes that “the European dimension 
of decision-making [is bringing it] closer to citizens” (COM 2017/821, p. 3). Even if the 
proposals create greater ownership of collective decisions, the Commission neglects the long-
standing insights of fiscal federalism, particularly, the difficulties of overlapping 
competencies (Oates, 1972, Fossum & Jachtenfuchs, 2017). Thus, the Eurozone challenges 
will not cease until the Member States either surrender sovereignty, or fully commit to an 
automatic and independent rule-based architecture (Herzog & Hengstermann, 2013). 
In this paper, I study the long-run impact of the reform package proposed by the 
Commission. I distinguish between transformative proposals, which imply minor adjustments, 
and disruptive proposals that are new in nature (Table 1). The paper establishes a detailed 
economic and institutional assessment of the disruptive reform elements. The contribution to 
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the literature is twofold: first, I analyse the proposed fiscal capacity at the EMU level by 
investigating the feasibility and hypothetical implications of fiscal transfers across the 
Member States. Here, I utilize a simulation methodology. Second, I combine the numerical 
part with a behavioural study of polite-economic and institutional incentives in order to show 
blemishes of the proposed reform package, including the fiscal backstop, the convergence 
facility and the European minister of economy and finance. 
 
Table 1. Commissions Reform Package, 6 December 2017 
 
 
Source: own categorization. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 summarizes the related literature. The 
methodology is briefly described in section 2. Section 3 studies the institutional aspects of the 
reform package. In section 4, I quantitatively simulate the impact of a fiscal capacity. 
Thereafter, I analyse legal and economic impairments of the reform package in section 5. 
Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
1. Literature review 
This article relates to at least three strands of literature. First, the literature of the 
optimal currency area theory. This literature provides early ideas in order to mitigate 
economic imbalances in a currency union. Mundell (1961) suggested free markets, 
particularly labour mobility. McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), however, believed in 
centralized fiscal mechanisms. More recently, similarly to Mundell, Herzog and 
Hengstermann (2013) proposed a rule-based architecture that automatically imitates market 
mechanisms in order to stabilize the Eurozone. On the other hand, the Commission (2017) 
proposes a fiscal capacity or a finance minister following the notions of McKinnon and Kenen 
(cf. section 3). First, this literature reveals that the Eurozone is not an optimal currency union 
today. Second, the theory is undecided about the future institutional reforms in order to create 
a stable Eurozone. 
Second, there is a comprehensive literature about the negative effects in a currency 
union due to free riding and moral hazard. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999, 2000, 2003) and 
Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) show that binding fiscal rules are essential in order to mitigate 
fiscal profligacy and respective negative externalities. These arguments are supported by 
studies on historical monetary unions (Bordo & Jonung, 1999). Despite theoretical and 
empirical support for this literature, the Commission’s reform package does not sufficiently 
consider the negative effects, as we will explore in this paper too. 
The third field of literature is a long-standing debate about the cost and benefit of a 
fiscal union. Already Delors (1989) emphasized the need of fiscal coordination in a monetary 
union. Indeed, already the definition of a fiscal union is difficult. Issing, the former ECB chief 
economist, defines a fiscal union as follows (2013, p. 173): 
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“The term [fiscal union] can only be meant to mean a state or a state-like body, in 
which, according to democratic rules, taxes, levies and public expenditures are uniformly 
decided. The "Europeanization" of the decision-making (...) makes it clear that there can be 
no fiscal union without a political union.”  
Moreover, he emphasises that scientists and policy-makers use the term «fiscal union» 
frequently dishonestly and manipulative. Even a transfer union is a part of a fiscal union 
(Issing 2013). Recently Blanchard (2017), Brunnermeier et al. (2017) and Bénassy-Quéré et 
al. (2018) propose further fiscal union mechanisms that are leading to a transfer union in the 
end. The ideas are European Safe Bonds (ESBies) or a fiscal capacity at the union level. 
Werning (2017) provides theoretical support for those mechanisms and the benefits of a fiscal 
union. However, at the same time, there exists research showing the risks of a fiscal union as 
well as the ineffectiveness of fiscal transfers in the Eurozone (Kehoe & Patorino 2017, 
Martinez-Garcia 2017, Bandeira 2018). They demonstrate that a fiscal union is unnecessary 
and costly, unless policy-makers establish a political union as prevalent in sovereign states. 
In this paper, we investigate the proposed disruptive ideas, particularly the 
implications of a fiscal capacity. The hypotheses are twofold. At first: Does a fiscal capacity 
under a neutral budget constraint have sufficient feasibility to stabilize asymmetric shocks? 
Or, does it create moral hazard and insufficient stabilization? Second, what are the economic, 
sociological and philosophical concerns of the proposed European mechanisms? In answering 
these research questions, we obtain new evidence for a successful reform strategy in order to 
convert the rule-based Eurozone in to an optimum currency area. In addition, this research 
setup allows us to evaluate also other recent proposals by Blanchard (2017) and Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2018). 
2. Methodological Approach 
The paper uses two different methodological approaches. First, we apply institutional 
economic methods, together with theories from sociology and philosophy, in order to study 
the incentive structure of the reform proposal (North, 1991, Sandel, 2012).  
The economic literature argues that the EMU has deprived Member States of monetary 
and exchange rate instruments. Consequently, for macroeconomic management only fiscal 
policy remains at the national level. Since the Eurozone is not an optimal currency area, the 
ECB’s one-size-fits-all policy produces asymmetric impulses to the economies (Mundell, 
1961, 1973, McKinnon, 1963, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). In order to compensate Member 
States for the loss of monetary policy, the Commission proposes a fiscal capacity as a new 
instrument. 
Secondly we study whether this proposal satisfy economic principles and tackles the 
economic root cause such as the economic heterogeneity in the Eurozone. We utilize a 
numerical simulation technique in order to study the feasibility of a fiscal capacity under the 
proposed constraints. The simulation supposes that a fiscal capacity already existed for all 
Eurozone Member States from 1999 to 2017. Then, under this assumption, we study the 
necessary financial contributions of Member States in order to mitigate country-specific 
asymmetric shocks. This simulation study reveals the limitations of a fiscal capacity in 
general, given sovereignty of Member States remains at the national level as proposed by the 
Commission. The details of the numerical computation is explored in equations (1) to (3) 
below. The combined application of this methodological approach is novel in this field of 
literature, particularly the analysis of the fiscal capacity. 
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3. Institutional Aspects of the Reform Package 
On 6 December 2017, the Commission set out a “roadmap” for the completion of the 
Economic and Monetary Union by 2025. The transition period is divided into an immediate 
phase lasting until 2019 along with a second phase lasting until 2025. The greater agenda is to 
complete the “Financial Union”, “Fiscal Union” and “Economic Union” under the roof of the 
EU(-Commission). The reform package is mainly concerned with the “Fiscal Union” along 
with new mechanisms such as a “European Monetary Fund”, which includes a fiscal capacity 
that smooth asymmetric shocks across Eurozone countries. In addition, the proposal strives to 
enhance economic governance on the one hand and democratic accountability on the other 
hand. 
In general, the Commission follows Jean Monnet’s functionalist approach of path 
dependency and calls for further centralization (Wallace 1990, Rosamond 2000). Since the 
early 1990s, the majority of scientists have agreed that a well-functioning monetary union 
requires, in one way or another, fiscal coordination. However, policy-makers naïvely built the 
Eurozone on neither automatic rule-based coordination nor a political union. In fact, in recent 
years the Maastricht architecture is steadily revised towards a mixture of responsibilities, 
defined by national and supranational mechanisms. The 2017-reform package of the 
Commission deliberately argues for the centralization of powers despite growing political and 
public resistance.1 
In any case, without sufficient democratic control and political integration, a transition 
of a monetary union into a state-like body would be unprecedented. Nonetheless, the notion of 
supra-nationalisation is the «default mode» of European integration, however leading into 
uncharted territory (Scharpf, 2011, Schout, 2017). A simplified notion of integration is a risky 
strategy, given that a currency union must be both economically and culturally homogeneous 
(Alesina et al. 2017). Up until today, the rule-based architecture of Maastricht entailed fiscal 
responsibilities merely at the national level (Herzog & Hengstermann, 2013). 
What does the Commissions’ reform package newly suggest? 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) 
The Commission publishes the details of the TSCG in two separate documents: the 
motivation on the one hand (COM 2017/824) and the Council Directive under the 
consultation procedure on the other (CNS 2017/0335). This proposal intends to integrate the 
intergovernmental TSCG, signed by 25 Member States2 on 2 March 2012, into Union law. In 
principle, the TSCG complements the Stability and Growth Pact (EU No 1466/97 and 
1467/97). It requires national debt rules, despite the treaty being international law so far. In 
order to make the TSCG binding, the Commission incorporates it in Union law, particularly 
the essence of Article 3 – the so-called Fiscal Compact (COM 2017/821, p. 7). Article 3 
requests a balanced budget rule in structural terms together with an automatic correction 
mechanism (COM 2017/821, p. 8). 
New Budgetary Instruments 
The literature of the optimum currency area provides ideas on budgetary instruments 
in order to mitigate imbalances. Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1973) and Kenen (1969) 
suggested different decentralized and centralized mechanisms. Here are the four sub-
                                                 
1 Recently we have even seen a growing populism with an anti-European notion. Early populism was more about 
anti-globalization and anti-trade, according to Rodrik (2017). 
2 All EU Member States except Czech Republic and United Kingdom. 
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proposals of the Commission in order to ensure the stability of the euro area, including new 
instruments (COM 2017/822):  
▪ A “Reform Delivery Tool”, in order to support the reform commitment of Member 
States, and a “Technical Support Tool”, which is a request of Member States; 
▪ A “Convergence Facility” for Member States on their way to the euro; 
▪ A “Fiscal Backstop” for the Single Resolution Mechanism, in order to establish a 
lender of last resort in case of bank failures; 
▪ A “Fiscal Capacity” in order to stabilize the EMU, particularly in case of large 
asymmetric shocks. 
The proposal intends to enhance the economic governance under the present rule-
based architecture. However, a fiscal backstop and a fiscal capacity are rather disruptive and 
new for the Eurozone architecture (Table 1). While the transformative elements use existing 
financial sources, the new elements require additional sources either indirectly via transfers or 
through newly designed (European) taxes (COM 2017/822). 
Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) 
The CPR consists of regulations, which amends existing EU regulations (COM 
2017/825). The regulation 2017/0336 (COD) and 2017/0334 (COD) are amending the EU 
regulation 1303/2013 and Council regulation 1083/2006. The CPR enhances the financial 
resources under the existing Structural and Investment Fund. In addition, it aims to provide 
budgetary support, identified under the European Semester. In contrast to the existing funds, 
the proposal sets milestones and grants new powers to the Commission in order to monitor 
and evaluate the implementation of the reform commitment. The proposal, however, does not 
modify the overall level of expenditure (COM 2017/821, p. 9). Furthermore, it strengthens the 
“Structural Reform Support Programme” that provides tailor-made service and technical 
support to Member States (EU No 2017/825). The CPR newly offers support to non-euro 
Member States in preparing for their euro accession. 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) 
Already the MacDougall Report (Commission 1977) and Delors (1989) referred to the 
idea of a European monetary fund. The present proposal consists of a Council Regulation 
(APP 2017/0333), which is subject to the consent of the European Parliament under Article 
352 TFEU (COM 2017/821, COM 2017/827). The Commission argues that the 
intergovernmental governance of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is insufficient, 
despite having ensured stability. On the one hand, the proposal transfers the ESM into an 
EMF grounded in Union law, which strengthens the transparency, specifically synergies in 
legal review (COM 2017/821). On the other hand, the EMF has newly unprecedented 
functions, and among other things, a lending and borrowing capacity (COM 2017/827, COM 
0333 APP). The EMF is designed as a unique legal entity and facilitates the raising of new 
funds; it can issue capital market instruments or borrow in the market. In order to be more 
reactive in urgent events, decision-making is supposed to be no longer unanimous. In turn, it 
is partially endorsed by a qualified majority rule (COM 2017/827). Moreover, the EMF has 
additional elements, such as: 
▪ Foreknow direct involvement alongside the EU’s Financial Assistance Programmes in 
order to strengthen the reform conditionality of future EMF programs; 
▪ A common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), the second pillar of the 
Banking Union (EU No 806/2014) and its Single Resolution Mechanism (COM 
2017/821, p. 6); 
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▪ A new stabilisation function, such as a “Fiscal Capacity” or other instruments. 
European Minister of Economy and Finance 
Completing the Euro with a European minister of economy and finance is hardly a 
new idea in policy and academic circles. In the field of foreign policy, the EU already has a 
kind of minister. It is a high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, currently filled by Ms Mogherini. The proposal adopts this model to the field of 
economic policy in order to strengthen the coherence, efficiency, transparency and democratic 
accountability of economic governance (COM 2017/821, p. 10). Simultaneously, the 
European minister of economy and finance is the Vice-President of the Commission and the 
president of the Euro-Group. The proposal is justified, according to the Commission, due to 
the complexity of the Eurozone architecture and the overlapping legal frameworks (COM 
2017/821, p. 10). Interestingly, the Commission confesses that the factual complexity is the 
decentralized responsibility in economic and fiscal matters. To that extent, the proposal paints 
over national sovereignty and does not suggest any improvement about the true challenge. 
The Commission states (COM 2017/81, p. 10): “The Minister would strengthen the European 
dimension of economic policy-making and ensure strong parliamentary scrutiny at EU level, 
without calling into question national competences.” However, as long as fiscal powers 
remain in national sovereignty, any European minister increases complexity and overlapping 
responsibilities. 
In the next section, I begin to analyse the reform package in detail. I investigate the 
disruptive idea of the fiscal capacity, which intends to smooth large asymmetric shocks across 
euro area countries. 
4. Simulation of a Fiscal Capacity 
The previous section introduced the institutional aspects of the reform package, 
including the establishment of a fiscal capacity. In fact, this is a rather disruptive and new 
proposal. First, it turns the ESM in to an EMF grounded in Union law. Second, it contains a 
fiscal capacity in order to provide cross-country insurance in the event of large asymmetric 
shocks. The Commission claims that the fiscal capacity can be designed fiscally neutral over 
the medium term and without transfer payments across countries. Both constraints are legal 
requirements under the present treaty. In this section, I empirically study both boundary 
conditions in detail. 
Customarily, a European fiscal capacity intends to reduce economic imbalances. 
However, what would happen if one country is booming and all others are in balance? For 
instance, consider the case in Ireland from 2000 to 2006. Should the fiscal capacity slow the 
booming economy in order to eradicate the imbalance? Indeed, it is hard to imagine that 
expansionary effects of the single monetary policy can be neutralized by a supranational fiscal 
capacity. Even national fiscal policy is insufficient to neutralize monetary policy due to 
limited scope.  
In recent years, Germany has set a precedence. The low interest ~ and exchange rates 
kept Germany’s economy booming and asset prices soaring. At the same time, German fiscal 
policy is deliberately neutral and even slightly contractionary. Despite fiscal contraction in 
recent years – Germany has budget surpluses – the growth dynamic did not slow down. 
Moreover, Bandeira (2018) shows in a DSGE model that fiscal transfers cause a welfare loss 
by the funding distortions of the capacity. He concludes on page 35 “welfare can actually fall 
when fiscal transfers are implemented. All in all (…) a scheme of fiscal transfers needs (…) to 
minimize the distortions its funding causes.” 
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Next, we compute the monetary contributions to the fiscal capacity based on 
numerical simulations for the euro area’s 19 Member States from 1999 to 2017. We utilize the 
official AMECO3 database from the Commission. We demonstrate that the fiscal capacity is 
insufficient to mitigate the imbalances, particularly under the funding assumption of budget 
neutrality over the medium-term and the assumption of no transfers across countries. In the 
following, we explain the methodology of the simulation approach.  
First, we have to identify all country-specific asymmetric shocks in comparison to the 
euro area business cycle over the years. Thus, I compute the annual difference of the output 
gap of country i (xi,t ) with respect to the output gap of the euro area 𝑥𝐸𝐴, according to 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖=𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝐸𝐴      (1) 
 
Equation (1) identifies all asymmetric shocks per country and year. Table 2 denotes 
the results of all asymmetric shocks. A negative number represents a negative economic 
shock that is worse than the Eurozone average. A positive number denotes a country’s 
favourable economic situation in comparison to the aggregate euro area. 
Looking to the numbers in Table 2, we discover massive heterogeneity across 
countries. There is an imbalance of asymmetric shocks across countries and years. Some 
countries have 12 – others only four – asymmetric shocks in 18 years. In some years, 13 out 
of 19 countries face asymmetric shocks, while in other times only five. 
 
Table 2. Asymmetric Shocks per Country and Year in percentage point 
 
 
 
Source: own computation. 
 
According to the Commission’s proposal, the fiscal capacity only has to mitigate large 
asymmetric shocks. Hence, I define a large asymmetric shock as an output gap difference of 
at least one standard deviation according to equation (1). Under this definition, the number of 
asymmetric shocks declines significantly per country and year (Table A1 – Appendix). Now, 
on average, there are only 3.1 large events per country and year, in comparison to 8.2 in 
Table 2. That means that there are averagely three asymmetric shocks per country per 18 
years. Or, on average, there are 3 out of 19 euro area countries hit by a large asymmetric 
shock per year (Table A1). 
However, during the great recession of 2009 and the following years, more than six 
Member States were faced with a large asymmetric shock. Indeed, Italy, Greece and Portugal 
have had seven or more asymmetric shocks, while Ireland, Malta and Austria have had none 
                                                 
3 Note the AMECO data contain the output gap (xi) for 19 euro area countries and the euro area as whole.  
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in the last18 years (Table A1). As a result, despite the focus on large asymmetric shocks, 
there is still great heterogeneity across countries. Can a fiscal capacity manage this 
heterogeneity? 
In step two, I compute the financial contributions to a fiscal capacity per country 
subject to the neutral budget constraint condition. In economically good times countries pay 
in the fiscal capacity in order to get money out in economically bad times. I define the 
required balanced budget principle for the period of 1999 to 2017, which would be considered 
long-term. However, if the budget constraint does not work in the long-term, it can be argued 
that it will definitely not work in the medium-term. Multiplying the asymmetric shocks 
(Table 2) with the GDP of country i respectively, yields 
 
𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑖=𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖∗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖     (2) 
 
The essence of equation (2) denotes the amount each country would have to pay to a 
fiscal capacity in order to compensate for its asymmetric shocks under the proposed 
constraints (Table 3). By adding the financial contributions (the positive numbers) and 
disbursements (the negative numbers) for each country, you obtain zero. Hence, this is 
showing that the computation satisfies the balanced budget constraint. Most notably, the 
annual contributions for the countries are partly substantial. For instance, Germany has to pay 
on average 1.2 percent of its GDP every year; or, in 2017, it had to pay the sole amount of 
36.2 bn Euro (Table 3). Greece and Spain even had to pay, on average, 6.7 percent and 2.6 
percent with respect to GDP (Table 3). Given the substantial financial contributions, in order 
to smooth all asymmetric shocks, such a full capacity is politically unrealistic. 
 
Table 3. Fiscal Capacity per Country and year in bn Euro 
 
 
 
Source: own computation. 
 
Moreover, it is remarkable that the asymmetric shocks have been persistent in the 
majority of countries, over many years. In Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland, the asymmetric 
shocks continue for more than four years (Table 3). In general, the long duration indicates a 
massive problem for any fiscal capacity, including a supranational fiscal union (Farhi & 
Werning, 2017, Bandeira, 2018). Note that a fiscal stimulus is only effective in the short-term 
(Tcherneva, 2011). Indeed, when considering persistent shocks, countries would rather need 
monetary support or structural reforms than a supranational fiscal capacity. Consequently, the 
proposal treats mainly the symptoms. Indeed, a fiscal capacity is unable to solve the root 
causes of asymmetric shocks because the Eurozone is not an optimum currency area! 
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Finally, the annual volume of the EMF is highly volatile and displays significant 
imbalances across countries and over years. The aggregate imbalance ranges from a deficit of 
64.8bn Euro to a surplus of 58.7bn Euro (Table 3). Given this imbalance, the aggregate 
capacity only balances if we allow for substantial transfers across countries or considerable 
borrowing at the European level. Certainly, both actions are hardly in line with the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
Even worse, the fiscal capacity creates pro-cyclical behaviour. During the great 
recession of 2009, more than half of the Member States had to pay in to the capacity in order 
to balance the account in the medium-term (Table A1). Note, in 2009 all countries faced the 
severest recession in almost 100 years, yet get no support from the fiscal capacity! This would 
have had amplified pro-cyclical policy of the funding countries. Thus, the argument that the 
EMF minimizes pro-cyclical policies remains unproven. Similarly, Brunnermeier et al. (2017) 
recognizes that European Safe Bonds – so-called ESBies – are not functional if there is 
substantial cross-country heterogeneity (Acharya & Dogra, 2017). 
In Table 4, I compare the needed financial contributions per country with respect to 
GDP while considering smoothing either all or only large asymmetric shocks. The numerical 
computation follows the basic Newton-Raphson iteration method. I compute the average 
financial contribution to the fiscal capacity, under the assumption that it smooths out the 
asymmetric shocks AsyShocki in each country under the following balanced budget constraint 
 
,      (3) 
 
i.e. each of the 19 euro area countries must have a balanced budget over the period of 
1999 to 2017. Under this assumption, two observations stand out. 
Firstly, the financial contribution for large asymmetric shocks is substantially smaller, 
as well as the scope of the fiscal capacity (Table A2). Under this assumption, Germany has 
had two asymmetric shocks, while Greece has had seven in the last 18 years. Interestingly, we 
identify no large asymmetric shock in France nor Malta and Austria during the whole period. 
Hence, the fiscal capacity that accounts for large asymmetric shocks does not support 
Member States equally. Even during the severe recession of 2009, the majority of states 
would not have received support. On the contrary, they would have to pay in to in order to 
guarantee the balance in medium-term, creating pro-cyclical behaviour yet again. At the same 
time, countries that do need support receive modest funding despite large asymmetric shocks. 
In fact, letting the (domestic) automatic stabilizers work is likely more effective than a fiscal 
capacity responsive to large asymmetric shocks (Bandeira, 2018). 
Secondly, even if the fiscal capacity focuses on large asymmetric shocks, 
heterogeneity remains across countries. The financial contributions in percent of GDP vary 
substantially as denoted by the second column of Table 4. Furthermore, the aggregate deficit 
(-63.3bn Euro) of the fiscal capacity is almost as high as if they were under the assumption of 
all asymmetric shocks (-64.8bn Euro). This demonstrates a fiscal capacity is infeasible under 
the legal constraints due to the cross-country heterogeneity in the Eurozone. In fact, 
heterogeneity would require, regardless of the scope, either a monetary transfer or permission 
to borrow at the Union level. This, however, contradicts the proposal of the Commission as it 
infringes the rule-based architecture of the European treaty today. 
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Table 4. Average Contributions to the Fiscal Capacity per Country in Percent of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: own computation. 
 
In summary, there is little reason to have a debate about a fiscal capacity when it will 
be ineffective. In a rule-based architecture and from an economic point of view, it is more 
effective to design fiscal buffers at home. To be fair, demanding fiscal buffers during 
economically favourable times in order to smooth asymmetric shocks is not new; the Stability 
and Growth Pact requests domestic buffers and even a balanced budget in medium-term since 
1997. Member States, however, have never enforced this rational in practice. To this extent, 
the fiscal capacity intents to imitate or even eliminate the rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Overall, an effective fiscal capacity either needs a political union, including a European 
budget, or undercuts the Member States’ responsibility in a rule-based architecture. 
5. Institutional Implications and Policy Recommendations 
In this section, I assess the 140 pages of the reform package, but consider only the 
disruptive elements. In particular, I study the proposed institutional incentive structure as well 
as the economical, sociological and philosophical implications. 
I. New Budgetary Instruments 
The proposed fiscal backstop and fiscal capacity create new overlaps in 
responsibilities and a mixture of powers across the national and European level. Thus, there is 
the risk that they are beyond the present legal architecture. The main argument in favour of 
both mechanisms is the limited size of the EU budget alongside a required prohibition of 
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borrowing in Europe. Indeed, only in special cases, “the EU is empowered to borrow and 
lend” (COM 2017/822), notably under the Balance of Payments Facility (EC No 332/2002) or 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EU No 407/2010). Of course, in exceptional 
cases, there is the possibility of European coordination under Article 20 TEU and Article 
326ff TFEU, however, macroeconomic stabilization is deliberately the responsibility of 
supranational monetary and national fiscal policy (Article 119 TFEU and 136 TFEU). 
Interestingly, the Commission's objective is also more far-reaching as it “intends (…) 
to support Member States’ agreed reform commitments financially” (COM 2017/822, p. 5). 
This implies that the Commission wants to buy reform commitments. In general, Sandel 
(2012) shows that money cannot buy commitments. In fact, there is empirical evidence that 
money erodes the intrinsic motivation to enforce reforms while continuously degrading the 
people who are suffering under the reforms (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee & Eichenberger, 1996; 
Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). 
In addition, the proposed convergence facility of future euro and non-euro Member 
States is risky, even if “the distinction between them is becoming less relevant over time” 
(COM 2017/822, p. 5). Alesina et al. (2017) and Herzog (2018) demonstrate a growing 
divergence between euro and non-euro Member States. Alesina et al. (2017) conclude:  
“(…) there is virtually no evidence of cultural convergence, neither within nor across 
countries. If anything, we see cultural divergence. (…) The process of European integration 
devoted considerable effort to the diffusion of best practices, (…), which was not very 
successful.” 
Among other things, in a rule-based architecture countries have to demonstrate their 
readiness to adopt the euro without financial support. Indeed, joining the euro requires 
sustainable public finances before and afterwards (Herzog, 2016; Ademmer, 2018). Thusly, 
the degree of convergence has to be achieved without European interventions. Apart from the 
Maastricht criteria in Article 140 TFEU and in Protocol No 13, real economic convergence is 
imperative for a successful membership (COM 2017/822, p. 9, COM 2017/825, p. 1). Worse 
yet, a study by the Commission (2017) shows a real dispersion in recent years as well. So, 
does new money really help more? Under the rule-based framework, it is evident that a 
convergence facility would likely bias the economic readiness of new Member States. This 
mechanism creates unsustainable incentives and moral hazard for candidate countries 
(Jones, 2018). 
Similar arguments apply to a fiscal capacity. Our simulation results in section 4 
demonstrate the misconception. Since the 1970s, the idea of Keynesian stabilization has failed 
accordingly (Bartlett 1993, Lewis 2009). Activating financial resources to deal with shocks 
that cannot be managed at the national level alone have two flaws (COM 2017/822, p. 13). 
First, managing shocks effectively always requires monetary policy, not primarily fiscal 
policy. Second, any fiscal stimulus crowds out private investments. Keheo and Patroni (2017) 
find that a fiscal union (or fiscal capacity) is only optimal when countries are either unable or 
unwilling to pursue desirable policies. Moreover, they show a fiscal “authority is unnecessary 
if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance” (Kehoe & Patroni, 2017). Nevertheless, 
the Commission justifies the fiscal capacity with its stabilization function and the goal of 
cross-country insurance. In addition, Martinez-Garcia (2017) finds that a stabilization 
mechanism in a currency union leads to indeterminacy of monetary policy. 
Following the Maastricht architecture, I recommend building-up fiscal buffers in each 
Member State. Then, when faced with asymmetric shocks, countries use these buffers 
together with the automatic stabilizers. As long as fiscal policy remains in national 
responsibility, I recommend precautionary mechanisms in order to handle asymmetric shocks. 
Addressing asymmetric shocks with a European stabilization facility ex post is costlier and 
less effective, as evidenced by the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. 
71 
Bodo Herzog  ISSN 2071-789X 
 RECENT ISSUES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2018 
The authentic intension of a fiscal capacity is anyway different. The Commission 
(2017/822, p. 6) writes, “Unlike national budgets, the EU budget cannot incur debt (…). 
Instead, it relies on financing through own resources.” This reveals the political intension, as 
a fiscal capacity would allow either European borrowing or taxpayer money from Member 
States. Thus, the misconception is evident, given the Commission suggests automatic and 
rapid activation of the new fiscal capacity. In general, in a rule-based Eurozone, a fiscal 
capacity is likely noncredible because the Member States still have the fiscal responsibility 
and merely an limited fiscal commitment. As a matter of fact, the Commission has already 
speculated what would occur “if these buffers and stabilizers are not sufficient” (2017/822, p. 
13). Thus, the proposal reveals major flaws, particularly in light of the numerical results 
above. 
II. European Monetary Fund (EMF) 
Since the beginning of the EMU, the idea of a monetary fund existed. The EMF is 
designed to be the successor to the ESM, incorporating further powers, such as a fiscal 
backstop and a lending capacity (COM 2017/827, p. 6). The Article 136(3) TFEU warrants 
the legal foundation of the new lending and borrowing capacity. The Commission argues that 
Member States cannot unilaterally guarantee stability in exceptional situations. Note, 
however, despite the US being a political union par excellence, the 50 sovereign US-States 
have to manage its stability – except for natural catastrophes – alone, together with a strict no-
bailout rule (Sinn, 2016; Keheo & Patroni, 2017; Herzog, 2018).  
Juncker (2017) argues that the Eurozone requires strong governance, however, he is 
failing to recognize that the present rule-based architecture bestows sovereignty in fiscal 
matters exclusively to Member States. The Commission confess (2017/827, p. 3,5), “the role 
for the National Parliaments remains fully preserved, in view of the large contributions of the 
Member States to the EMU.” Yet again, this statement confirms that an effective fiscal 
capacity – as prevalent in sovereign states – requires the surrendering of national sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of monetary policy over fiscal, such as the 
announcement of the OMT program, comes from the credible and unlimited commitment of 
the central bank. The ECB-President said (Draghi, 2012): “The ECB is ready to do whatever 
it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” An unlimited fiscal 
commitment, however, is impossible as long as there is no political union. Thus, in a rule-
based architecture any fiscal commitment is less effective. 
In addition, the Commission states (COM 2017/827, p. 3) the “ESM generates a 
complex, landscape where judicial protection, respect of fundamental rights and democratic 
accountability are fragmented and unevenly implemented. (…) the decision-making process 
under an intergovernmental method usually requires cumbersome national procedures (…)”. 
However, as long as the EMF has to respect the sovereignty of Member States, the same 
complex and cumbersome national processes apply to the EMF.4 Thus, either the EMF is a 
replica of the ESM in Union law, or it is an infringement on national sovereignty. 
Looking ahead, the legal initiative is subject to Article 352 TFEU. Already today, 
several Member States cast doubt upon this legal foundation. For instance on 31 January 
2018, the majority of the Deutsche Bundestag argued for the need of a treaty change. 
Nonetheless, there is an even more fundamental critique. An EMF would not mitigate 
the current account imbalances and real divergence in the Eurozone. Tackling these issues 
                                                 
4 The EFM creates a transfer mechanism. This is reiterated on p. 10 (COM 2017/827): “(…) the Union would be 
equipped with a full range of permanent stabilization facilities covering the entirety of the Member States, and 
drawing on considerable financial resources, over and beyond those accessible through the EFSM.” 
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require a full transfer union. Therefore, the EMF in its current form treats the symptoms of 
heterogeneity rather than the root cause: the EMU is not an optimal currency area! 
Overall, the EMF infringes the economic essence of Article 123 TEFU. The proposal 
suggests (COM 2017/827, p. 26) “The loans provided by the EMF could be provided without 
conditionality”. However, according to the case  Pringle v Ireland, conditionality is a 
requirement in the rule-based architecture of today (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2011, 
Armingeon & Cranmer, 2017). Furthermore, the proposal contains a ‘perbedeu mobile’: The 
EMF purchases debt in the primary market and the ECB purchases the debt from the EMF in 
the secondary market (COM 2017/827, p. 11). This creates a vicious debt-circle. In the end, it 
jeopardizes the objective of a lasting and stable monetary union. 
III. European Minister of Economy and Finance 
The idea of a European minister of economy and finance would simplify decision-
making processes, which are not sufficiently understandable nor efficient today (COM 
2017/823, p.1; COM 2017/823, p. 2). Of course, the merger of jobs would create synergies, 
particularly during the enforcement of the European Semester (Savage & Howarth, 2018; 
Calliess, 2018). The new function would “promote better the general interest of the Union and 
the euro area economy, both internally and at a global level” (COM 2017/823, p. 3).  
However, Herzog and Hengstermann (2013) show that the true challenge is the 
enforcement of fiscal rules as well as the institutional complacency in Europe. A proposal that 
simply sticks to sovereign Member States without enhancing fiscal governance, does not 
tackle the root causes of the yet instable Eurozone. 
Interestingly, the scope of the European minister is even “serving the broader goals of 
fiscal (…) redistribution” (COM 2017/823, p. 4). This would require “the individual and 
collective willingness of the Member States”, according to the Commission. Or, in short, a 
political union. But on page 5, they claim the minister “would [not] impinge on national 
competences.” If this holds, a European minister would be likely rather marketing. It remains 
questionable whether a minister, as designed in the proposal, “would be an important 
institutional step for a more coherent, effective and accountable economic governance of the 
European Union” (COM 2017/823, p. 4). 
In summary, there is mixed evidence about the reform package. A fiscal union that 
keeps responsibilities at the national level and, at the same time, demands European decision-
making, is an oxymoron. Legally, this is difficult to organize and would require a treaty 
change (COM 2017/821, p. 12). Although the Commission demands “a clear sense of 
direction for the period of 2019-2024”, the reform package is hardly consistent. In this regard, 
the proposals do not bring justice to further European integration. As a matter of fact, the 
Commission is its own prisoner. Either it sticks to the  rule-based architecture or it demands 
the mission impossible: a political union. A mixture of both would definitely be the worst 
case. 
6. Conclusion 
The Economic and Monetary Union is at a crossroads. The Commission claims 
without supranational instruments, such as a fiscal capacity, the EMU will fail. Nonetheless, 
the reform package reveals  a muddling through with a new mixture of responsibilities. Any 
institutional mixture, however, would create inefficient governance and a flawed democratic 
legitimization. Looking ahead, the core principle has always been, since the Treaty of 
Maastricht, control and responsibility in the same – so far national – hand. Sticking to a 
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consistent rule-based architecture is better than a mixture of powers that threatens the stability 
of the Eurozone as a whole. 
The analysis of the reform package, particularly concerning the disruptive elements, 
shows that the proposals do not hold the bold promises of the Commission. The Commission 
fails to show a feasible sequencing strategy of willing Member States; – in order to create a 
“Europe of Pioneers”. But if the Commission cannot create a partnership of eager countries, it 
should stick to and enhance the rule-based architecture of Maastricht. 
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